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Abstract. This paper addresses the board flooding problem of Juels et
al.’s coercion-resistant electronic voting scheme. A key property of this
scheme is the possibility of casting invalid votes to the public board,
which are indistinguishable from proper votes. Exactly this possibility is
crucial for making the scheme coercion-resistant, but it also opens doors
for flooding the board with an enormous amount of invalid votes, there-
fore spoiling the efficiency of the tallying process. To prevent such at-
tacks, we present an adaption of the scheme in which each voter receives—
in addition to the proper credential—some dummy credentials from the
election registrars. Dummy credentials may be used to deceive possible
coercers. The list of all dummy credentials is published along with the
electoral register. Based on the electoral register and the list of dummy
credentials, the system is now capable of making a distinction between
invalid votes generated from dummy credentials and invalid votes gener-
ated from fake credentials. While the former are kept until the tallying
phase, the latter are immediately rejected by the public board. If the
public board additionally rejects all incoming duplicate votes, then its
maximum size is bounded by the total number of issued credentials. This
guarantees an efficient linear-time tallying phase even in case of a mas-
sive board flooding attack with a very large number of invalid votes.
Although the solution presented in this paper does not yet entirely rule
out vote selling or coercion, it makes it at least unbearable for the vast
majority of voters.
1 Introduction
One of the most challenging problems in remote electronic voting is the design
of a system that prevents voters from selling their votes or from being coerced.
The first scheme that is resistant against both the selling of votes and the coer-
cion of voters has been proposed by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson in [7]. To
achieve coercion-resistance (which implies mere receipt-freeness), the so-called
“JCJ-scheme” uses an anonymous authentication mechanism to guarantee that
the identities of the voters remain hidden during the whole voting and tally-
ing process. The anonymous authentication mechanism requires that during the
registration phase each voter receives a secret credential over an untappable
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channel. The knowledge of the secret credential allows the voter then to post an
encrypted vote anonymously to the public board, such that its inclusion in the
final tally is guaranteed. It is also possible to post invalid votes based on fake
credentials, but those will be filtered out later during the tallying phase. Since
board entries created from proper credentials are indistinguishable from those
created from fake credentials, it is always possible to lie about the secret cre-
dential or to supply a coercer with a fake credential. The vote buyer or coercer
will then see the posted invalid vote on the public board, but at this early stage
of the protocol, there is no way to tell whether a particular board entry will be
included in the final tally or not. This is the principal mechanism that renders
the JCJ-scheme coercion-resistant.
The JCJ-scheme is the point of departure of most advanced protocols for re-
mote electronic voting today dealing with coercion-resistance, but the protocol
as presented in [7] has at least two major open problems.3 The first problem
is the quadratic running time of the tallying process, where duplicate and in-
valid votes need to be eliminated. Detecting duplicate votes requires so-called
plaintext equivalence tests (PET) [6] for every pair of votes cast, and detecting
invalid votes requires each vote cast to be checked against the public electoral
register, thus making the scheme quite inefficient for large scale elections. The
Civitas system [3], an implementation of the JCJ-scheme, weakens this prob-
lem by breaking up the electoral register into various independent blocks of a
given fixed size. Several other improvements based on hash tables were proposed
by Smith, Weber, and others [8,13,14,16,17], but they have been shown to be
vulnerable to Pfitzmann’s attack against anonymous channels [12]. More recent
developments in this direction are based on group signatures [1,2] or fake votes
generated by the talliers [15].
The second major problem of the JCJ-scheme results from the aforemen-
tioned possibility of posting invalid votes based on fake credentials to the pub-
lic board. Exactly this possibility is crucial for making the scheme coercion-
resistant, but it also opens doors for flooding the public board with an enormous
amount of invalid votes. Because invalid votes are indistinguishable from proper
votes from the perspective of the public board, there are no direct counter-
measures against such types of attack, i.e., as long as the incoming votes cast
are well-formed and comply with the protocol, the public board needs to treat
them all in the exactly same manner. A massive application-level flooding at-
tack of that kind may therefore both jeopardize the availability of the public
board and spoil the efficiency of the tallying process. To our best knowledge, no
practical solution to this problem has yet been proposed in the literature. The
problem itself seems to be intrinsic to the chosen approach.
In this paper, we propose an extension of the JCJ-scheme that addresses
both aforementioned problems. The key idea is to equip the public board with
a stronger filter on what is an acceptable vote cast. For this, the voters receive
during the registration phase some dummy credentials (in addition to the secret
credential), which may then be used to mislead potential vote buyers or coercers.
3 Further major and minor problems of the JCJ-scheme are discussed in [9,14].
Invalid votes generated from these dummy credentials will be accepted by the
public board (and filtered out later), but invalid votes from fake credentials will
be rejected immediately. As we will see, enhancing the JCJ-scheme in such a way
has a number of potential pitfalls. These pitfalls will be discussed and possible
solutions will be presented.
The major benefit of our method results from the public board’s ability to
separate invalid votes created by fake credentials from those created by dummy
credentials. Let n denote the number of voters, m the number of issued dummy
credentials, and s the number of votes cast using fake credentials. Note that
n and m are fixed during the registration phase, whereas s is unbounded (and
possibly orders of magnitude larger than n+m). If we further assume that the
public board is also capable of eliminating duplicate votes, we can introduce an
upper limit n+m for the size of the public board.
Another important benefit of our approach is the fact that the known attacks
against the linear-time improvements proposed by Smith [14] and Weber [16,17]
are no longer possible. The reintroduction of these improvements allows the
elimination of all types of invalid votes (duplicate, fake, and dummy) in linear
time, which reduces the total running time of the original JCJ tallying phase
from O(n2 + s2) to O(n+m). If furthermore m = d · n for some constant d > 0
(the average number of dummy credentials issued per voter), then the tallying
phase even runs in O(n) time.
Unfortunately, this unprecedented leap in performance and robustness has
some negative effect with respect to perfect coercion-resistance. It is possible to
minimize this effect to a small subset of unfortunate voters, which receive the
minimum amount of dummy credentials, but some residual aﬄiction will remain.
The same holds true for vote buying. We will discuss this topic and see how to
further minimize this problem.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we give a short
overview of the original JCJ-scheme and discuss its properties and problems.
The proposed solution for the board flooding problem and the corresponding
extension of the JCJ-scheme is discussed in Section 3. We first exhibit the general
idea, then give a semi-formal sketch of the adapted protocol, and finally discuss
some of the above-mentioned pitfalls. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Coercion-Resistant E-Voting
The goal of the scheme proposed by Jules, Catalano, and Jakobsson in [7] is to
make remote electronic voting resistant against all sorts of coercion. Coercion-
resistance is defined as a stronger form of privacy. While privacy is defined
in terms of an adversary that cannot interact with voters during the election
process, it is assumed that a coersive adversary may interact with voters at any
time. Thus an election scheme is called private, if the adversary cannot guess
the vote of any voter better than an adversarial algorithm whose only input is
the final tally, and the scheme is called coercion-resistant, if the adversary can
be deceived into thinking that a coerced voter has behaved as instructed. Such
a scheme thus prevents voters from selling their votes or from being coerced in
various ways, e.g. to vote in a particular way, to vote at random, to abstain from
voting, or even to divulge the private keying material [7].
The JCJ-scheme is the first electronic voting protocol that offers full coercion-
resistance under minimal assumptions. While many other protocols assume the
existence of an untappable channel during the voting phase to offer mere receipt-
freeness, an untappable channel is only required during the registration phase of
the JCJ-scheme. Note that this assumption is realistic, because the registration
process often requires the voters to visit the registration office in person. We will
now briefly describe the JCJ-scheme in a semi-formal way. The main entities in
the protocol beside the voters are the following:
Registrars They issue the secret credential to voter Vi and pronounce corre-
sponding encryptions publicly to the system. A threshold encryption system
guarantees that the secret credential is only known to the voter and that
the protocol is safe even if a minority of the registrars is corrupted or under
attack.
Tallying Authorities They are responsible for processing the votes cast, jointly
decrypting and counting the votes, and publishing the final tally. Again, a
threshold encryption systems guarantees the safety of the protocol even if a
minority of the tallying authorities is corrupted or under attack.
The votes cast are published on an append-only public board. Its task is to
accept and publish every well-formed vote cast that complies with the protocol.
To guarantee the integrity and availability of the board, it may be replicated in
such a way that a minority of unavailable or corrupted board servers does not
prevent its functioning properly as a whole [5,11].
The whole voting protocol is divided into three major phases, during which
the voters are authenticated anonymously. The protocol uses numerous crypto-
graphic primitives such as encryption, digital signatures, non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge, plaintext equivalence tests, re-encryption mix-
nets, anonymous channels, etc. A first overview of the protocol is given in Fig-
ure 1.
Registration Each voter Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, receives a secret credential σi jointly
generated by the registrars. This credential constitutes a proof of eligibil-
ity, which is used in the voting phase to cast the vote. Additionally, an
encryption Si = Encε(σi, γi) of σi with randomness γi is appended to the
(digitally signed) electoral register on the public board. ε denotes the tally-
ing authorities’ common public key. The protocol assumes the majority of
the registrars to be trustworthy and the channel between the registrars and
Vi to be untappable.
Voting The voters cast their candidate selection ci ∈ C via an anonymous
channel to the public board. The message posted to the board consists of
Ai = Encε(σi, αi) and Bi = Encε(ci, βi) along with corresponding zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge of σi and ci. It is important that the candidate
set C is finite and that an additional disjunctive proof that ci represents
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Fig. 1. Overview of the original JCJ-scheme: the first filter eliminates votes with invalid
proofs and duplicate votes from the public board, while the second filter checks the
votes cast against the electoral register (and thus eliminates votes created from fake
credentials).
a valid candidate choice is provided. This proof is needed to prevent the
construction of receipts based on invalid candidate choices.
Tallying The tallying authorities check the proofs included in the votes cast
and jointly perform pairwise PETs on the encrypted credentials to eliminate
duplicates. The resulting adjusted list of votes cast is shuﬄed in a verifi-
able re-encryption mix-net to anonymize the votes and credentials included.
Respective proofs of correct shuﬄing are published on the public board.
Another verifiable re-encryption mix-net is applied to the electoral regis-
ter, which finally allows the tallying authorities to jointly check the validity
of the encrypted credentials involved in the votes cast (without decrypting
them). Votes accompanied with fake credentials are discarded. The resulting
adjusted list of proper votes is decrypted and tallied.
What makes this particular system coercion-resistant is the fact, that any posted
entry to the public board is accepted if it is well-formed and complies with the
protocol. It must thus consist of a valid candidate selection and some credential
encrypted by the tallying authorities’ common public key (together with cor-
responding proofs of knowledge). But the credential must not necessarily be a
proper credential issued by the registrars and thus constituting a proof of eli-
gibility, it simply needs to have the format of a proper secret credential. This
enables the voter to deceive potential coercers with a fake credential, simply
by choosing one at random. Votes accompanied with such fake credentials are
discarded during the tallying phase. The two mix-nets involved in the tallying
phase guarantee that no voter can prove to a third party whether a particu-
lar vote cast has been discarded before tallying or not. This feature makes the
system resistant against selling votes or coercing voters.
Scheme by Smith and Weber [14,16,17] Instead of applying PETs on
all pairs of distinct votes for removing duplicates, both Smith and Weber in
essence suggest computing and decrypting Azi = Encε(σ
z
i , α
z
i ), where z ∈ Zq is a
random value shared among the talliers. The resulting blinded credentials σzi are
stored in a hash table for collision detection in linear time (clearly, σi = σj , iff
σzi = σ
z
j ). Both authors propose using the same procedure for eliminating votes
created from fake credentials, but since the same exponent z is used across all
ciphertexts Ai, the coercer gets an attack strategy to identify whether a vote
with known σi is counted, namely by posting two votes, one that includes an
encryption of σi and one an encryption of σ
2
i [1,3,12]. Note that this attack is
not applicable to the mere removal of duplicates.
3 Preventing Board Flooding Attacks
In this section, we describe a way of modifying the JCJ-scheme to become re-
sistant against board flooding attacks and to allow a linear-time tallying phase.
As this implies several major and minor changes to the JCJ-scheme throughout
various parts of the scheme due to different reasons, we uncover them step by
step. A discussion of some important related questions follows in the second part
of this section.
3.1 The Modified JCJ-Scheme
To protect the public board against application-level flooding attacks, it needs
to be equipped with a stronger filter on what to accept. The main idea of our
approach is to accept only votes cast from legitimate voters. Since it is crucial
for the original JCJ-scheme to accept any vote cast, even those accompanied
with a fake credential, it seems to be impossible in the first place to make such a
distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate voters. But by introducing a
third category of credentials, so-called dummy credentials, which are distributed
to the voters during the registration phase (together with the proper secret
credential), it is possible to reject all votes accompanied by fake credentials
right from the beginning. Thus the idea is that the dummy credentials take over
the role of deceiving potential vote buyers or coercers. This means that during
the vote casting phase, they need to be treated in the same way as the secret
credentials, whereas fake credentials are immediately rejected. In other words,
voters are equipped with several access keys for posting votes to the public board,
but only one of them is a key to include votes in the final tally. A first overview
of the extended protocol is given in Figure 2.
More formally, let {τij : 1 ≤ j ≤ di} be the set of dummy credentials for voter
Vi (note that that di might be different for every voter, see Subsection 3.2). They
are generated jointly by the registrars during the registration phase, together
with Vi’s secret credential σi. Corresponding encryptions Tij = Encε(τij , γij)
with randomness γij are published on the public board together with Si =
Encε(σi, γi). The public board thus contains two separate lists of encrypted
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Fig. 2. Overview of the extended JCJ-scheme: the first filter discards votes created
from fake credentials, the second filter removes duplicates, and the third filter checks
the votes against the electoral register (and thus eliminates votes created from dummy
credentials). The final list of proper votes is decrypted and counted.
credentials: the original electoral register S = {Si : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and the new set
T = {Tij : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ di} of dummy credentials. With ST = S ∪ T we
denote the complete set of encrypted credentials. Furthermore, we denote the
number of all issued dummy credentials by m = |T | = ∑ni=1 di, which implies
that a total of |ST | = n + m credentials have been issued in all. Those are the
ones that will be accepted by the public board during the vote casting phase.
To detect fake credentials for filtering out corresponding invalid votes, the
public board needs to check for each incoming vote cast whether the included
encrypted credential matches with one of the entries in the list ST . We can safely
apply Smith’s and Weber’s linear-time scheme here, because all votes based on
arbitrarily fake credentials are already dropped at this early stage. Note that
to install this first filter, we require the help of the talliers already during the
voting phase. Compared to the original JCJ-scheme, this is a true disadvantage
of our approach, but it is the key for restricting the size of the public board to an
upper limit. To do so, the detection and removal of duplicate votes needs to be
performed simultaneously, again by applying safely Smith’s and Weber’s scheme
and with the help of the tallying authorities. In Figure 2, these tasks of the public
board are called “Filter 1” and “Filter 2”, respectively. Note that ST needs to
be shuﬄed in a verifiable re-encryption mix-net, similar to the shuﬄing of S in
the original JCJ-scheme. This is important for disguising the links between the
voters and their entries in ST .
The rest of the tallying phase is similar to the original JCJ-scheme, except
that the elimination of duplicate votes has already been conducted. Therefore
both, the list of encrypted votes registered on the public board and the list
S of encrypted secret credentials, are shuﬄed in corresponding re-encryption
mix-nets. Respective proofs of correct shuﬄing are published. The output of the
two mix-nets are then used to separate the valid votes from those generated by
dummy credentials, again by applying safely Smith’s and Weber’s linear-time
scheme. In Figure 2, this task is called “Filter 3”. At the end, the adjusted list
of encrypted votes is jointly decrypted and tallied by the tallying authorities.
3.2 Discussion
The above description of the adapted JCJ-scheme outlines the general ideas of
our approach. The modifications raise several important questions. Some of them
will be discussed below.
How many dummy credentials are needed? To answer this question, sup-
pose first that each voter receives exactly d ≥ 1 dummy credentials from the
registrars, i.e., let di = d for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Each voter would then have d extra
credentials to deceive potential vote buyers or coercers. The problem of such a
scenario is that the secret credential could only be withhold as long as not all
d dummy credentials are “expended”. A coercer could thus force the voter to
release all d + 1 credentials and use them to cast d + 1 identical votes. If all
d + 1 votes cast appear on the public board, it follows that one of them (the
one that includes the proper credential σi) will be included in the final tally.
Otherwise, if some of the votes cast do not appear on the public board, then the
coercer knows that the voter was lying about some of the credentials. Using a
similar line of reasoning, votes could be sold by passing all d + 1 credential to
a vote buyer. Therefore, a constant number of dummy credentials clearly ruins
the coercion-resistance property of the scheme.
The above argument leads to the conclusion that the registrars have to gen-
erate a varying number of dummy credentials for each voter. Suppose that Vi
receives di ∈R {1, . . . , d} dummy credentials, i.e., di is chosen at random between
1 and a fixed upper limit d. If the scheme guarantees that di is unknown to po-
tential coercers (which includes the registrars and the tallying authorities), then
Vi may lie about di, for example by passing all di (or less) dummy credentials
to the coercer and by claiming that the secret credential is included in that list.
This argument works for every Vi with di > 1, but unfortunately not for those
with di = 1. Under coercion, such (unfortunate) voters could only give away a
single dummy credential, but they could not claim it to be the secret credential.
Note that this problem does not disappear by increasing the lower limit of the
interval {1, . . . , d} to some value c < d or by decreasing it to 0. Even worse, a
similar problem exists for the upper bound d, because voters with di = d dummy
credentials could sell their votes by simply handing over all d+ 1 credentials to
the vote buyer (as in the case of a constant number of dummy credentials). This
problem could be solved by not imposing an upper limit to the interval, but this
brings up new problems of practicability in cases where di becomes very large.
As an answer to the above question, we suggest here that di, the number of
dummy credentials for voter Vi, is determined according to some non-uniform
probability distribution over sets Nd = {1, . . . , d} or N = {1, . . . ,∞} of natural
numbers.4 The most natural candidate distribution with an upper limit d is
a binomial distribution B(d, p) with shape parameters d and p. The idea is to
choose d and p such that only a very small fraction of voters get the minimum
number (di = 1) or the maximum number (di = d) of dummy credentials. This
is the case if the variance of the distribution is relatively small compared to d.
In this way, we cannot entirely rule out vote selling or coercion, but we can at
least make it unbearable for the vast majority of voters.
The most natural candidate distribution with no upper limit is a normal
distribution N (µ, σ2) with some reasonable values for the mean and the variance.
Since normal distributions are density functions defined over R, they need to be
applied in some discretized manner over N. Many other distributions are possible,
but a more exhaustive discussion of this questions is beyond the scope of this
paper.
How do the registrars generate a random number of dummy creden-
tials? The na¨ıve approach for the registrars to generate a random number of
dummy credentials for voter Vi is to jointly apply the chosen probability distri-
bution to determine di and to generate each of the di dummy credentials using
the same distributed procedure as for the secret credential σi. The problem of
this simple approach is that di is not a secret of Vi alone, i.e., Vi cannot lie
about it towards potential voter buyers or coercers if they collude with one of
the registrars.
As a solution to this problem, we suggest to split up the group of registrars
into r sub-groups. Each of these sub-groups is then responsible for generating
roughly di/r dummy credentials, but without informing the other groups about
the exact number. To do so, we need to decompose the chosen probability func-
tion into a sum of r probability functions with parameters adapted accordingly.
In the case of a binomial distribution B(d, p), for example, each sub-group may
simply use the distribution B(d/r, p) to determine their numbers independently,
because B(d, p) = r·B(d/r, p). Similarly, a normal distribution N (µ, σ2) can be
split up into a sum of r normal distributions N (µ/r, σ2/r2), because normal
distributions are closed under linear combination. Note that we need to assume
a majority of each sub-group to be trustworthy.
How should the public board store the encrypted dummy credentials?
In the original JCJ-scheme, the encrypted credentials Si are published on the
public board together with the plaintext identities of the voters. The list S
plays thus the role of a electoral register, which can be inspected and verified
by everybody. By doing the same with the encrypted dummy credentials, i.e.,
by linking each Tij ∈ T publicly with Vi’s identity, we would allow potential
coercers or vote buyers to derive the secret number di = |{Tij ∈ T }| from T .
But as already discussed above, coercion-resistance can only be guaranteed as
long as di is Vi’s secret, since otherwise Vi looses the ability to lie about it.
4 We explicitly exclude the borderline case di = 0, because it would completely disallow
Vi to deceive a passive coercer who does nothing but directly observing Vi’s vote
casting process (shoulder surfing attack).
As a simple solution to this problem, we suggest that the set T of encrypted
dummy credentials is published anonymously without any links to the voters.
Since T does not serve as an electoral register, it does not necessarily need to be
treated in exactly the same way as S. However, this solution is only applicable
if deleting entries from the electoral register is prohibited over multiple voting
events. Otherwise, additional mechanisms need to be introduced to delete the
entries in T that belong to the deleted entry in S.
What is the benefit of the modified scheme? The original JCJ-scheme
has three critical time-consuming components: the elimination of duplicates, the
mixing of the votes in the re-encryption mix-net (as well as the verification
of the proofs produced by the mix-net), and the elimination of invalid votes
(see Figure 1). The input size of each of these components depends directly
on the number of votes, not the number of voters. Since costly cryptographic
computations such as zero-knowledge proofs and multi-party computations are
needed to perform these tasks, processing a single additional vote is expensive.
Techniques that avoid the processing of votes that will not appear in the final
tally are therefore inherently appealing.
Let n = |S| denote the number of voters (or the number of proper votes if all
voters participate in the election) and s the number of duplicate or invalid votes.
In the original JCJ-scheme, eliminating duplicates by performing pairwise PETs
over all n+s votes requires O(n2+s2) relatively expensive steps. If no duplicates
are removed (worst case), n+s is the input size for both the re-encryption mix-net
and the final procedure for eliminating fake votes. In the literature of verifiable
mix-nets, we find techniques with proofs of linear size [4,10,18], but all of them
involve relatively high constant factors. The final elimination of fake votes again
requires O(n2+n·s) expensive PETs. In total, the JCJ-scheme runs in O(n2+s2)
time and O(n+ s) space.
Our modified approach improves the overall performance of the scheme in re-
spect of both, computation time and memory space. Note that we have the same
three critical components, only arranged in a different order. If m =
∑n
i=1 di =
|T | denotes the total amount of dummy credentials issued during the registra-
tion phase, we get an O(n+m) upper limit for both the size of the public board
and the input of the mix-net. As s may become orders of magnitudes larger than
m in case of a large scale board flooding attack, this states a major improve-
ment over the original scheme. It prevents situations where the system becomes
unavailable due to a memory overflow of the public board.
The modified scheme also eliminates the need for the quadratic number of
PETs for eliminating invalid votes. Here we benefit from the methods proposed
by Smith [14] and Weber [16,17], which allow duplicate and fake votes to be
detected in linear time. Therefore, all components involved in the tallying phase
run in O(n + m) time and space, which implies an overall O(n + m) running
time for the whole modified scheme. This is a considerable improvement over
the original scheme under all possible circumstances.
What is the downside of the modified scheme? In the presented form, our
scheme allows statistical attacks which may possibly influence the outcome of a
voting event. For example, a vote buyer may offer a certain amount of money
for each additional credential (dummy or proper) handed over by the voter. In
this way, a potential vote seller gets a personal interest in handing over as many
credentials as possible—including the proper one. An analogous strategy may
be applied by the coercer. However, depending on the total number of dummy
credentials and the parameters of the chosen distribution function, these attacks
may become very cost-intensive for both, the vote buyer and the coercer. This
raises the question of finding the optimal distribution function to maximize the
cost of such statistical attacks. Answering this question is beyond the scope of
this paper and is left for future work.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the board flooding problem in the JCJ-scheme
for remote electronic elections. As a solution, we propose that each voter re-
ceives a set of dummy credentials along with the proper secret credential during
the registration phase. For this enhancement to work, it is important that the
number of dummy credentials varies from one voter to an other, and that only
few voters will get the minimum or maximum number of dummy credentials.
The votes posted to the public board can then be filtered such that only votes
created from proper or dummy credentials are retained. Duplicate votes are also
immediately eliminated in linear time. In this way, there will never be more en-
tries on the public board than the total number of issued (proper and dummy)
credentials. The lack of such a filter leads to the board flooding problem in the
JCJ-scheme.
This paper is a first step in transforming the impractical JCJ-scheme—
applicable under the assumption of unrealistic computing power only—into a
practical scheme. Our proposal allows the voting authorities to trade-off the effi-
ciency of the tallying procedure against the obtained level of coercion-resistance.
Future work will focus on the residual statistical vulnerability for coercion and
vote buying. Currently, we are studying the possibility of obtaining additional
dummy credentials on demand during the voting phase, for example by exchang-
ing dummy credentials between voters.
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